March 10, 2026: What’s Going On With Shipping

Today’s focus is the Strait of Hormuz: what vessel traffic actually looks like, what the US military is saying about possible escort operations, and what the trade consequences are if this disruption continues.

What’s happening in the Strait of Hormuz

Some ships are still moving through the strait. Transit has not gone to zero. One example highlighted is a bulk carrier identified as having Chinese ownership and crew, because that may matter. The working assumption is similar to what happened in the Red Sea: some Chinese-linked shipping may keep operating where others pull back.

At the same time, the traffic picture is not fully trustworthy. AIS and public marine tracking data are being distorted by electronic interference and spoofing, attributed here to Iran. So when people look at public vessel maps and see ships apparently stacking up, stopping, or behaving strangely, part of that picture may be false or misleading.

What to make of the US escort discussion

The next issue is General Kaine’s remarks about possible US Navy escort missions in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. As presented here, the military is assessing options, force requirements, command structure, and ways to reduce the risks if such a mission is ordered.

The basic interpretation is that no clear, executable public plan is being communicated yet. That matters, because commercial shipping is not going to regain confidence just because officials say options are under review. Confidence returns when there is a visible, credible demonstration that the strait is open and ships can be protected while transiting it.

There are also practical constraints:

• only so many escort ships are available
• carrier strike groups have to protect themselves
• ships need refueling and rearming
• logistics can become a bottleneck very quickly

UNCTAD trade numbers highlighted in the episode

A March 10 UNCTAD report on the Strait of Hormuz disruption is cited, with the trade moving through the strait broken down roughly as follows:

• 38% crude oil
• 29% liquefied petroleum gas
• 19% liquefied natural gas and refined oil products
• 13% chemicals, including fertilizer
• 3% containers
• 2% dry bulk

The report also provides the traffic collapse numbers highlighted in the video:

• 141 ships on February 27
• 81 ships on February 28
• 4 ships on March 8

That is framed as roughly a 97% drop relative to the February average of 129 ships.

Why Asia is especially exposed

Asia is presented as the main exposure point. Using the cited figures, about 14.3 million barrels per day moved through the area in 2024, and about 84% of that oil went to Asia. Around 83% of LNG flows through this route are also described as essential to Asia.

The argument here is that LNG may be the more immediate vulnerability than oil, because replacement capacity is more limited. Oil markets are extremely important, but LNG substitution can become constrained faster.

Fertilizer is a major issue too

This is not just an oil story. Fertilizer is another major vulnerability. About one-third of global seaborne fertilizer trade is said to pass through the strait. The cited product shares are approximately:

• 67% of urea
• 20% of DAP
• 9% of MAP

Countries described as especially exposed include Sudan, Sri Lanka, Australia, Tanzania, Somalia, Pakistan, Thailand, Kenya, New Zealand, and Mozambique.

Expected knock-on effects

If this disruption continues, the expected chain of effects looks like this:

• higher oil prices
• higher gas prices
• higher fertilizer prices
• higher food prices
• higher tanker and fuel costs
• broader supply-chain stress

The pressure is expected to fall hardest on developing economies with weak fiscal capacity and heavy import dependence.

Overall takeaway

The central point is straightforward:

1. the Strait of Hormuz disruption is already materially reducing vessel movement;
2. public ship-tracking data is only partially reliable because of spoofing and interference;
3. the biggest near-term risks are energy, LNG, fertilizer, and freight costs;
4. trade normalization likely requires a credible, operationally ready naval protection plan.

Final point

This is not a localized shipping inconvenience. It is a chokepoint crisis with global implications. If secure passage through the strait is not restored, the result is likely to be deeper shocks in energy, transport, fertilizer, and food markets, with developing countries taking the hardest hit.