Satellites are the backbone of several mission-critical services that enable our modern society to function, for example, GPS. For years, satellites were assumed to be secure because of their indecipherable architectures and the reliance on security by obscurity. However, technological advancements have made these assumptions obsolete, paving the way for potential attacks, and sparking interest in satellite security. Unfortunately, to this day, there is no efficient way to collect data on adversarial techniques for satellites, hurting the generation of security intelligence that can lead to the development of effective countermeasures. In this paper, we present HoneySat, the first high-interaction satellite honeypot framework, fully capable of convincingly simulating a real-world CubeSat, a type of Small Satellite (SmallSat). To provide evidence of HoneySat's effectiveness, we surveyed experienced SmallSat operators in charge of in-orbit satellites and deployed HoneySat over the Internet to entice adversaries. Our results show that 90% of satellite operators agreed that HoneySat provides a realistic and engaging simulation of a SmallSat mission. Additionally, HoneySat successfully deceived human adversaries in the wild and collected 22 real-world satellite-specific adversarial interactions. Finally, in a major demonstration of HoneySat's robustness, we collaborated with an aerospace company to perform a hardware-in-the-loop operation that resulted in HoneySat successfully communicating with an in-orbit, operational SmallSat mission.